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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether listed ﬁrms in China adjust their capital structure in response to an increase in the corporate tax
rate. Although theories of capital structure suggest that corporate tax is an important determinant of capital structure, how exogenous
changes of the tax rate aﬀect ﬁrms’ leverage decisions has not been fully explored. We examine a unique circumstance in which the Chi-
nese government increased the corporate tax rate of ﬁrms that had previously received local government tax rebates. The evidence indi-
cates that these ﬁrms increased their leverage when the corporate tax rate increased. Further investigation suggests that the adjustment of
leverage was mostly driven by ﬁrms with a high level of access to bank loans.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: G32; G21; H25; E62
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1. Introduction
Classical capital structure theories (e.g., Modigliani and
Miller, 1958, 1963) suggest that corporate tax aﬀects capi-
tal structure. Because interest expenses are deducted before
tax, debt has a tax advantage over equity, and this tax
advantage increases with the corporate tax rate. In a per-
fect world with no transaction costs, ﬁrms would ﬁnance
with 100% debt. When there are bankruptcy costs or other
costs, ﬁrms have an optimal capital structure that trades oﬀ
the costs and beneﬁts of debt. Firms with higher tax rates
use more debt.1
Empirical studies on the relationship between tax rates
and capital structure are voluminous. Earlier studies (e.g.,
Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988) ﬁnd no
evidence to support theoretical predictions that leverage
levels and ﬁrms’ non-debt tax shields are substituted.
Recent studies, such as Scholes et al. (1990) and Graham
(1996, 1999), ﬁnd that marginal tax rates and leverage are
simultaneously determined. However, these studies do
not answer the question of how an exogenous change in
the tax rate aﬀects ﬁrms’ leverage decisions.
To examine the eﬀect of an exogenous change in the tax
rate on leverage, researchers need to examine a circum-
stance in which the corporate tax rate has been changed
exogenously. Suitable circumstances are rare and are often
accompanied by other events that could potentially aﬀect
ﬁrms’ capital structure. Givoly et al. (1992) examined the
1986 US Tax Reform Act. They ﬁnd that after the tax
reform, ﬁrms that had experienced larger drops in the cor-
porate tax rate reduced their use of debt. However, the
1986 Tax Reform Act aﬀected personal tax at the same
time, which will also aﬀect capital structure (Graham,
2003). This severely complicates the research design.
Although Givoly et al. (1992) use lagged dividend yield
as a control variable for the personal tax eﬀect, Rajan
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and Zingales (1995) indicate that diﬀerent measurements of
personal tax will substantially aﬀect the conclusions.2
In this paper, we examine a unique circumstance in China
in which the central government terminated local govern-
ment tax rebate (LGTR) policy. In this circumstance, ﬁrms
that had received LGTR faced an exogenous increase in the
tax rate, whereas other ﬁrms were unaﬀected and, thus, can
serve as a natural benchmark. Also, in this case, the per-
sonal tax rate was unchanged. Therefore, our case is more
appropriate than that in Givoly et al. (1992) for examining
the eﬀect of an exogenous tax rate change on leverage.
Our circumstance also enables us to address another
interesting issue. As noted by Rajan and Zingales (1995),
previous studies of capital structure have often relied on
data from United States. How those theories apply to other
countries is under-explored. In emerging markets, such as
China, the supply of ﬁnancing sources is usually limited.
Therefore, even when ﬁrms feel the beneﬁts of adjusting
leverage, that adjustment may be constrained by the ﬁnanc-
ing sources available. Only ﬁrms with good access to
ﬁnancing sources can adjust leverage in a timely manner.
We examine how the access to bank loans aﬀects ﬁrms’
adjustment of leverage in response to the tax change.
Our results indicate that ﬁrms that had received LGTR
increased their leverage by 3.3% in the three years after the
termination of the LGTR, compared to other ﬁrms. The
leverage increases were signiﬁcant in two of the three years
following the termination of LGTR. We also ﬁnd that the
adjustment of leverage was more pronounced in ﬁrms that
had a high level of access to bank loans. Our paper contrib-
utes to the understanding of the relationship between tax
and capital structure. The results are consistent with the
theory that corporate tax rate aﬀects capital structure.
However, similar to the ﬁndings in previous literature,
the adjustment of leverage, though signiﬁcant, is relatively
small in magnitude. Our paper also sheds light on the sup-
ply side of ﬁnancing. The results indicate that in an emerg-
ing market such as China, access to bank loans may
constrain ﬁrms’ adjustment of leverage.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The
next section introduces the institutional background and
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample
and methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background and hypotheses development
The corporate tax rate for Chinese listed ﬁrms is gener-
ally 33%, according to the 1993 Acting Regulations on
Corporate Income Tax. However, the central government
provides more favorable tax incentives in various regions.
For example, there are favorable tax rates of around 15%
in the ﬁve special economic zones, 32 economic and tech-
nology development zones, 13 free trade zones, and 52
high-tech development zones. The government intends to
use preferential tax rates to stimulate economic develop-
ment in speciﬁc regions.
Although the tax rates for listed ﬁrms are set by the cen-
tral government, the taxes are mostly collected and kept by
the local governments in ﬁrms’ registered locations. For
these local governments, the taxes collected from listed
ﬁrms are not a small amount. Also, listed ﬁrms often
contribute to local economic development and bring
employment opportunities. Therefore, local governments
in diﬀerent regions compete with each other to attract
listed ﬁrms. One way that local governments attracted
listed ﬁrms previously was with the LGTR, that is,
listed ﬁrms ﬁrst paid tax according to the nominal tax
rate of 33%, and then the local government would reim-
burse them for 18%, making the actual statutory tax rate
about 15%. Tax competition was so ﬁerce that more than
40% of the listed ﬁrms in our sample had received the
LGTR.
On October 11, 2000, the Ministry of Finance announ-
ced a formal ruling that prohibited local governments
from providing LGTR to listed ﬁrms after December
31, 2001. The new ruling speciﬁcally subjected listed com-
panies to the 33% corporate income tax rate. With this
ruling, the actual tax rate for ﬁrms that had received
LGTR increased from 15% to 33%, which increased the
tax advantage of debt relative to equity. Therefore, we
expect that LGTR ﬁrms will have the incentive to increase
their debt.3 Our ﬁrst hypothesis, stated formally, is as
follows.
Hypothesis 1. Firms that had received local government
tax rebates (LGTR) increased their leverage in response to
the termination of the LGTR policy.
Although LGTR ﬁrms have the incentive to increase
leverage, how successfully they can make the adjustment
depends on their ability to change the leverage. One
method for ﬁrms to increase leverage is to keep the same
debt and reduce their equity by paying out cash dividends.
However, for ﬁrms with good growth opportunities, which
is normal in a fast-growing country such as China, the
reduction of equity may be very costly. Therefore, ﬁrms
usually rely on the other method, that is, they borrow
more.
In China, as in other transition economies, access to
external debt ﬁnancing is limited compared to developed
countries. The public bond market is almost non-existent,4
so ﬁrms mainly rely on bank loans for debt ﬁnancing.
However, borrowing from banks is still not easy, because
2 Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that if top personal tax rates are assumed, then
the 1986 Tax Reform Act signiﬁcantly aﬀects the capital structure,
whereas if the average personal tax rates are assumed, then the 1986 Tax
Reform Act does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the capital structure.
3 To the best of our knowledge, there were no other signiﬁcant changes
in tax rates that aﬀected our sample ﬁrms.
4 As Allen et al. (2005) indicate, corporate bonds account for less than
1% of GDP in China.
L. Wu, H. Yue / Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 30–38 31
the demand for funds is much larger than the supply
(Jiang and Zhan, 2005). Banks cannot charge higher
interest rates5 for loans; therefore, they usually provide
loans to ﬁrms with which they have a good relationship
or which can provide ﬁnancial guarantees for the loans.
The accessibility of bank loans restricts ﬁrms’ ability to
adjust their leverage. Therefore, we expect that LGTR
ﬁrms with high level of access to bank loans will be more
likely to increase their leverage in response to the tax
increase. In contrast, LGTR ﬁrms that have problems
obtaining bank loans will have limited ability to increase
their leverage. Our second hypothesis, stated formally, is
as follows.
Hypothesis 2. The leverage increases of LGTR ﬁrms in
response to the termination of the LGTR policy are
aﬀected by the ﬁrms’ access to bank loans. LGTR ﬁrms
with a high level of access have larger adjustments of
leverage.
3. Sample and methodology
Our ﬁnancial data comes from the CCER China Stock
Database, provided by SinoFin Information Services. We
examined ﬁnancial statements to identify whether a ﬁrm
had received LGTR in 2001. For inclusion in our ﬁnal sam-
ple, we imposed several criteria: (1) the ﬁrm was not in the
ﬁnancial industry, was listed before 2001, and was not reg-
istered in west or central China; (2) the ﬁrm disclosed
whether it had received LGTR in the 2001 annual reports;
and (3) the ﬁrm had a positive book value and the neces-
sary ﬁnancial information for a calculation of the variables.
The ﬁrst criterion excludes newly listed ﬁrms and ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms. These ﬁrms may have diﬀerent determinants of
capital structure. It also eliminates ﬁrms in areas in which
the tax policies had been changed in the sample period. The
Chinese government set more preferential tax policies for
listed ﬁrms in west and central China to stimulate the
development of these areas. These changing tax policies
could confound our results. Five hundred and ﬁfty-three
ﬁrms passed the ﬁrst screening. The second criterion iden-
tiﬁes those ﬁrms that have been aﬀected by the termination
of LGTR and those that have not. After the third criterion
was applied, our ﬁnal sample includes 2182 ﬁrm-years.
There are 464 observations in each year from 2001 to
2003, and in 1999 and 2000, there are 372 and 418 observa-
tions, respectively.6 These ﬁrms come from seven provinces
(Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong,
and Hainan) or three autonomous districts (Beijing, Shang-
hai, and Tianjin) in east and southeast China. Although we
include less than one third of the provinces and autono-
mous districts,7 these regions play the most signiﬁcant role
in the Chinese economy (see Wu et al., 2005).
Our main analysis focuses on whether listed ﬁrms with
LGTR raised their leverage levels when LGTR was termi-
nated. On October 11, 2000, the Ministry of Finance
announced Document No. 99, which required that all local
governments terminate LGTR for listed ﬁrms by December
31, 2001. This termination signiﬁcantly increased the eﬀec-
tive nominal tax rate of the ﬁrms that had received LGTR
from 15% to 33%, therefore increasing the tax advantage of
debt. Firms, who intended to utilize the tax advantage,
would increase the leverage in response to the termination
of LGTR. Because the tax increase was in eﬀect from 2002,
to enjoy the tax advantage, LGTR ﬁrms would have had to
consider a higher leverage level at the beginning of 2002,
or, in other words, a higher ending leverage for 2001.
Therefore, the leverage changes, if there are any, would
begin in 2001.8
As in Givoly et al. (1992), we examine the tax eﬀect on
capital structure from the ﬁrst diﬀerence (change) regres-
sion. This is better than the level regression, because too
many factors aﬀect capital structure.9 In a level regression,
any factors that are not considered may introduce the omit-
ted variable bias. In a change regression, we only need to
consider the factors that have changed.
We measure the change of leverage in two ways. First,
we use the year-by-year change of leverage, that is,
DLEV(t) = LEV(t)  LEV(t1), where LEV(t) is the ending
leverage level at year t. This measures the change of capital
structure within one year. As pointed out by Myers (1977),
the adjustment of capital structure may be diﬃcult, and can
only be completed within a longer period. Therefore we
expect that LGTR ﬁrms will have positive leverage changes
from 2001 to 2003. We use the cumulative change of lever-
age within the three-year period (2001–2003) as our second
measure (DLEV = LEV(2003)  LEV(2000)). We expect the
cumulative leverage change to be more powerful in captur-
ing the eﬀect, if any, of LGTR termination on capital struc-
ture. We also include 1999 and 2000 as control periods.
LGTR ﬁrms should not have positive leverage changes in
these years.
We deﬁne leverage as total liabilities divided by the book
value of total assets. Another measurement of leverage, i.e.,
long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets, is
5 The central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), sets a reference
loan interest rate, and local banks have only minor discretion in adjusting
their actual rates around it.
6 The observations in 2000 and 1999 are fewer because newly listed ﬁrms
in those years have been excluded.
7 As of 2004, there were 27 provinces and four autonomous districts in
China.
8 Note that the tax advantage depends on the interest expenses deducted
before the tax, and the interest expenses depend on the average of debt
level, not just the ending level. Firms may also have changed leverage in
2000. But, given that the announcement of termination was close to the
year end, we do not expect a change. Also, given that the termination
became eﬀective more than one year later, ﬁrms would not want to
increase leverage too early.
9 For example, Frank and Goyal (2004) examine 38 factors predicted to
aﬀect capital structure.
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also widely used in the literature on capital structure.10 We
do not use long-term debt as the numerator in our main
analysis, because previous studies have found that listed
ﬁrms in China ﬁnance their debt mostly through short-term
liability. For example, Chen (2004) ﬁnds that in China,
total liability is, on average, 46% of total assets, whereas
long-term debt is, on average, only 7%. Therefore, exclud-
ing ﬁrms’ short-term liability is not appropriate.11
We use a dummy variable, LGTR, to indicate whether
ﬁrms had received local government tax rebates. LGTR
equals 1 if the ﬁrm received LGTR in year 2001, and 0
otherwise. Our main analyses regress the change of lever-
age on LGTR and other control variables. We expect
LGTR to be positively related to the change of leverage.
We also include other control variables. The literature
on capital structure suggests many factors that could aﬀect
decisions about it (Frank and Goyal, 2004). It seems
impossible to completely control all of the potential fac-
tors. However, our research design has an advantage.
Because we examine the change of leverage, we do not need
to consider those factors that have not changed during the
period. We choose several control variables, following Giv-
oly et al. (1992).
GROWTH is the growth of total assets, deﬁned as total
assets in year t divided by total assets in year t  1 minus 1.
The trade-oﬀ hypothesis of capital structure suggests that
high-growth ﬁrms will be more likely to go bankrupt there-
fore will use less debt. On the other hand, the expansion of
the business will require a large amount of funds, which
may not be suﬃciently supported by internal operations.
Therefore, high-growth ﬁrms may have larger leverage
changes.
AROA is the average of return on assets (before tax) in
year t and t  1, which we use to measure a ﬁrm’s proﬁt-
ability. According to the pecking order hypothesis (Myers
and Majluf, 1984), the ﬁnancing of a ﬁrm follows the
sequence of internal capital, then debt, and ﬁnally external
equity. Highly proﬁtable ﬁrms may be able to ﬁnance their
growth using earned income, whereas less proﬁtable ﬁrms
will be forced to resort to debt ﬁnancing and, therefore, will
increase leverage. In addition, an increase in the tax rate
will aﬀect after-tax income and, therefore, retained earn-
ings. AROA can also capture the eﬀects of tax changes
on performance.
LEV0 is the leverage at year t  1. The static trade-oﬀ
hypothesis of capital structure suggests that an optimal
capital structure exists. Therefore, when previous leverage
was too high, the ﬁrm tends to decrease it, whereas when
previous leverage was too low, the ﬁrm tends to increase
it.12 LEV0 is used to control the eﬀects of the initial lever-
age, and is expected to relate negatively to the change of
leverage.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t.
Larger ﬁrms may change their leverage more readily than
smaller ﬁrms. DDEP is the change of depreciation scaled
by total assets. Depreciation is a non-debt tax shield. When
the tax rate increases, ﬁrms can choose to increase leverage
or to increase the non-debt tax shield.
Note that the above independent variables are deﬁned to
correspond to the year-by-year leverage change. When the
cumulative change of leverage is used as a dependent vari-
able, year t  1 is set to year 2000, and year t is set to year
2003. In this way, the independent variables also measure
the cumulative changes.
We measure the accessibility of bank loans using the
percentage of non-tradable shares (NONTR). Listed ﬁrms
in China often issue both tradable and non-tradable shares
(also known as negotiable/non-negotiable). Tradable
shares are held either by domestic individuals or by other
ﬁnancial institutions, and can be traded on the stock mar-
ket. Non-tradable shares are held either by state/state-
owned enterprises or by other legal entities (i.e., other listed
or non-listed ﬁrms) and cannot be traded on the market. If
a ﬁrm has a large percentage of non-tradable shares, then it
may be controlled by the government or state-owned enter-
prises, both of which often have a close relationship with
banks, as the banking sector in China is dominated by
state-owned banks (Allen et al., 2005). Otherwise, if the
ﬁrm is not state-owned or state-controlled, then it is owned
by other large ﬁrms that could provide ﬁnancial support or
guarantees for bank loans. In comparison, tradable shares
are held by individuals and ﬁnancial institutions. Share-
holders often change, and they provide no help in borrow-
ing from banks. Therefore, the percentage of non-tradable
shares can proxy for a ﬁrm’s access to bank loans.
Our hypothesis predicts that LGTR ﬁrms with a high
level of access to bank loans will be more likely to increase
their leverage in response to the tax increase. To test the
hypothesis, we divide LGTR ﬁrms into two groups accord-
ing to whether the percentage of non-tradable shares is lar-
ger than the median. LGTR-LA includes LGTR ﬁrms that
have a percentage of non-tradable shares less than the med-
ian and, therefore, a low level of access to bank loans.
LGTR-HA includes LGTR ﬁrms that have a percentage
of non-tradable shares greater than the median and, there-
fore, a high level of access to bank loans. We then examine
the leverage changes of LGTR-LA and LGTR-HA ﬁrms,
with ﬁrms that received no LGTR as the benchmark.
Our proxy for the accessibility of bank loans captures,
to some extent, ﬁrms’ relationships with the government.
Therefore, to deduct Hypothesis 2, we implicitly assume
10 The literature also uses the market value of equity plus the book value
of debt as the denominator to measure the leverage. However, this market-
value-based measure is not appropriate when examining the change of
leverage, because any variation of the market price will lead to a change of
leverage.
11 In our robustness analysis, we also use long-term debt divided by the
book value of total assets to measure leverage. The results are qualitatively
the same.
12 In an emerging market, such as China, ﬁrms’ leverage could be
diﬀerent from the optimal level because of the diﬃculty of getting external
ﬁnancing.
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that all ﬁrms behave in a way that maximizes proﬁts. We
believe that this is a reasonable assumption, because our
sample ﬁrms are listed on the stock market and are subject
to the supervision of the market. Although a state share-
holder may have objectives other than proﬁt, shareholders
such as corporations, ﬁnancial institutions, and individual
investors impose pressure on listed ﬁrms to be proﬁt-ori-
ented. Also, ﬁrms are subject to extensive disclosure
requirements and to the control and monitoring of corpo-
rate governance mechanisms (such as boards of directors,
independent directors, outside audits, etc.). Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that all ﬁrms behave in a way that
maximizes shareholder wealth. However, we do note that if
those ﬁrms that are more connected to the government do
not behave in a way that maximizes shareholder wealth,
then it will bias against to ﬁnd the results that these ﬁrms
increase more leverage.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the means, medians, and standard devi-
ations for our main variables. We have 372 and 418 ﬁrms in
1999 and 2000, respectively, and 464 ﬁrms from 2001 to
2003. The change of leverage is, on average, positive, with
a mean of 1.39% and a median of 0.99%, which indicates
that the leverage increased for all ﬁrms during the sample
period. The increase of leverage is also conﬁrmed by
LEV0, which is the leverage at year t  1. LEV0 increased
from a mean of 42.55% (median 42.41%) in 1999 to 47.28%
(median 47.68%) in 2003. The growth of assets is, on aver-
age, 14.42% (median 8.42%), which is higher than the
return of assets, 3.66% (median 4.4%). This suggests that
the expansion of assets also relies on external ﬁnancing.
We use the percentage of non-tradable shares at the end
of 2003.13 The mean (median) is 58.32% (60.00%), indicat-
ing that most of the shares in typical listed ﬁrms cannot be
traded on the market.
4.2. Testing Hypothesis 1
Table 2 presents the changes of leverage conditional on
whether the ﬁrms received LGTR in 2001. We divide our
entire sample into two groups, according to whether the
ﬁrms received LGTR. In 2001, 192 ﬁrms received LGTR
and 272 ﬁrms did not. We then compare the means and
medians of leverage changes between these two groups in
the years from 2001 to 2003. In 2001, the change of lever-
age is, on average, 3.06% (median 2.36%) for LGTR ﬁrms,
whereas for non-LGTR ﬁrms it is, on average, 1.12% (med-
ian 1.26%). The t-test and Wilcoxon test indicate that the
diﬀerences of mean and median leverage changes are signif-
icant at less than 5% and 10% level, respectively. In 2002,
the changes of leverage between the two groups are indis-
tinguishable. In 2003, the leverage change of LGTR ﬁrms
is, on average, 2.96% (median 1.13%), which is again signif-
icantly higher than that of non-LGTR ﬁrms (mean 0.5%,
median 0.72%). The variable of cumulative leverage
changes indicates that the LGTR ﬁrms increased leverage
by an average of 7.52% (6.27% median) from 2001 to
2003, signiﬁcantly higher than the non-LGTR ﬁrms, which
increased by an average of 2.94% (2.64% median). We also
examine the changes of leverage in 1999 and 2000 as con-
trol periods. Because the termination of LGTR was
announced near the end of 2000, and was eﬀective from
the beginning of 2002, the leverage changes between the
LGTR and non-LGTR groups in 1999 and 2000 should
be indistinguishable. This is actually what we ﬁnd from
the data.
In Table 3, we use regressions to control other
variables that could possibly aﬀect the ﬁrms’ leverage deci-
sions. The dependent variable is change of leverage
(DLEV). The independent variables include LGTR,
growth (GROWTH), performance (AROA), previous
leverage (LEV0), ﬁrm size (SIZE), and change of non-debt
tax shield (DDEP). For control variables, the coeﬃcients
for GROWTH, AROA, and LEV0 are signiﬁcant in every
year from 1999 to 2003. GROWTH is positively related to
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Year Obs DLEV GROWTH AROA LEV0 SIZE DDEP
Panel A: Mean
1999 372 1.04 12.79 4.97 42.55 20.87 0.13
2000 418 0.97 22.54 5.01 43.25 21.04 0.55
2001 464 1.92 13.39 3.53 43.96 21.14 0.03
2002 464 1.39 10.13 2.51 45.88 21.22 0.04
2003 464 1.52 13.75 2.68 47.28 21.32 0.06
Total 2182 1.39 14.42 3.66 44.70 21.13 0.11
Panel B: Median
1999 372 0.72 7.65 5.73 42.41 20.80 0.01
2000 418 0.73 12.39 5.56 43.39 20.99 0.02
2001 464 1.55 6.83 4.41 44.17 21.09 0.07
2002 464 1.06 6.41 3.43 46.58 21.15 0.12
2003 464 0.88 8.93 3.20 47.68 21.27 0.04
Total 2182 0.99 8.42 4.40 44.98 21.07 0.01
Panel C: Standard deviation
1999 372 8.80 28.06 6.70 16.57 0.88 5.40
2000 418 10.71 43.88 5.79 17.79 0.87 5.91
2001 464 10.45 34.52 9.57 17.49 0.89 7.88
2002 464 8.91 23.71 9.73 18.14 0.89 6.90
2003 464 9.00 32.50 7.31 18.01 0.92 6.00
Total 2182 9.61 33.40 8.13 17.72 0.90 6.53
DLEV is the change of leverage, deﬁned as leverage(t)  leverage(t1),
where leverage is total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.
GROWTH is the growth of assets, deﬁned as total assets(t)/total assets(t1)
1. AROA is the average of return on assets (before tax) in year t and
t  1. LEV0 is the leverage of year t  1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets. DDEP is the change of depreciation from year t  1 to t,
divided by total assets. All variables except for SIZE are presented as
percentages.
13 We only have information for non-tradable shares in 2003. However,
the percentage of non-tradable shares would not change much, because
those shares could not be traded on the market.
34 L. Wu, H. Yue / Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 30–38
leverage change, which indicates that growing ﬁrms are
more likely to rely on external debt to ﬁnance their expan-
sion. AROA is negatively related to leverage change, which
is consistent with the pecking order theory that ﬁrms use
their internal funds ﬁrst. LEV0 is negatively related to lever-
age change. The coeﬃcient of SIZE is positive in all ﬁve
years and signiﬁcant in three. DDEP has mixed coeﬃcients.
Our variable of interest is LGTR. The coeﬃcient of
LGTR is positive in all three years from 2001 to 2003,
and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in 200114 and 2003, which
is consistent with our hypothesis and with previous descrip-
tive results. Therefore, the results suggest that ﬁrms
increased their leverage in response to the increased tax
rate, after other factors are controlled. In our control peri-
ods, 1999 and 2000, the coeﬃcient of LGTR is not signiﬁ-
cant at all, suggesting that the leverage increase after 2001
is not because of ﬁrm characteristics, but because of the ter-
mination of LGTR.
We also use the cumulative leverage change in the years
from 2001 to 2003 as our dependent variable. The control-
ling variables are consistent with the literature, except that
DDEP is not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of LGTR is 0.033
with t-statistics of 3.03, suggesting that LGTR ﬁrms
increased their leverage in the three years after the termina-
tion of the LGTR policy was announced.
In summary, the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis
1. Firms that had received LGTR did increase their lever-
age in response to the termination of LGTR. According
to our regression of cumulative leverage changes, an 18%
increase in tax rates leads to a 3.3% increase in leverage.
The change of leverage is statistically signiﬁcant, but seems
small in magnitude. However, our results are comparable
to existing studies that use US data. Givoly et al. (1992)
study the leverage changes around the 1986 tax reform
and ﬁnd an average of 0.7%. Graham (1996) ﬁnds that a
change in the tax rate from 24% to 46% will lead to an
increase in leverage of approximately 1.52% to 2.79%.15
Our evidence, then, is consistent with other studies that
the tax eﬀect is small relative to the theoretical prediction.
However, the reason is still unknown in the literature (see
Graham, 1996).
4.3. Testing Hypothesis 2
Our second hypothesis predicts that the accessibility of
bank loans aﬀects the leverage changes of LGTR ﬁrms.
The accessibility of bank loans is measured using the per-
centage of non-tradable shares in 2003. Firms whose per-
centage of non-tradable shares is higher than the median
have a high level of access to bank loans, and ﬁrms whose
percentage of non-tradable shares is lower than the median
have a low level of access to bank loans.
We divide our sample into three groups according to
LGTR and the percentage of non-tradable shares. Group
1 (N-LGTR) includes ﬁrms that had not received LGTR.
Group 2 (LGTR-LA) includes LGTR ﬁrms with a percent-
age of non-tradable shares that is less than the median.
Group 3 (LGTR-HA) includes LGTR ﬁrms with a percent-
age of non-tradable shares that is higher than the median.
Firms in Group 1 (N-LGTR) have no incentive to increase
leverage; they serve as a benchmark for our analysis. Firms
in Group 2 (LGTR-LA) have the incentive but a low abil-
ity to do so. Firms in Group 3 (LGTR-HA) have both the
incentive and a high ability to increase leverage.
Table 4 presents the means and medians of leverage
changes for the three groups. Our testing period is 2001–
2003, and the control period is 1999–2000. For each year
or cumulative years, we compare the mean and median
of leverage changes in Group 2 or 3 with those in Group
1. The results during the testing period show that the ﬁrms
in Group 3 (LGTR-HA) have larger leverage changes than
those in Group 1 in 2001 and 2003 and in the three-year
cumulative. The t-test and Wilcoxon test indicate that
the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant.16 The ﬁrms in Group 2
Table 2
Change of leverage conditional on LGTR
Year LGTR Obs Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon test
Panel A: Testing period
2001 0 272 1.12 1.26 2.05** 1.82*
1 192 3.06 2.36
2002 0 272 1.32 1.07 0.21 0.14
1 192 1.50 1.00
2003 0 272 0.50 0.72 2.77** 2.13**
1 192 2.96 1.13
2001–2003 0 272 2.94 2.64 3.26** 3.29**
Cumulative 1 192 7.52 6.27
Panel B: Control period
1999 0 224 1.36 0.46 0.85 0.46
1 148 0.56 1.02
2000 0 251 0.95 0.76 0.05 0.16
1 167 1.00 0.50
The change of leverage in each year (DLEV) is deﬁned as
leverage(t)  leverage(t1), where leverage is total liabilities divided by the
book value of total assets. The cumulative change of leverage during 2001
to 2003 is deﬁned as leverage(2003)  leverage(2000). DLEV is presented in
percentage. LGTR is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received
LGTR in 2001, and 0 otherwise. The sample is divided into two groups
according to whether LGTR = 1 or not. The table presents mean and
median of change of leverage for each group. We use t-test to test the
diﬀerence of mean and Wilcoxon score Test to test the diﬀerence of
median between these two groups. ** and * represents signiﬁcance at the
5% and 10% level, respectively.
14 The signiﬁcance in 2001 suggests that some ﬁrms adjusted their
leverage pretty fast. We examine whether the shareholdings of top
management will provide more incentives to adjust leverage but ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant results.
15 However, we should note that there are diﬀerences between these two
studies and ours. Givoly et al. (1992) do not present the average change of
tax rates. Graham (1996) deﬁnes leverage as long-term debt divided by the
market value of assets. Our results, therefore, are not directly comparable
to theirs.
16 The diﬀerence of medians in 2001 between Group 1 and Group 3 is
signiﬁcant at 10.2%.
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(LGTR-LA) have larger leverage changes than those in
Group 1 in 2001, 2002, and in the three-year cumulative,
but all of the diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant. We also exam-
ine the changes of leverage in the three groups within
the control periods of 1999 and 2000. The diﬀerences
between Group 2 (LGTR-LA) or Group 3 (LGTR-HA)
and the benchmark Group 1 (N-LGTR) are never signi-
ﬁcant. The results in Table 4 indicate that the ﬁrms
that have both the incentive and a high ability to increase
leverage (Group 3) signiﬁcantly increased their leverage,
whereas ﬁrms that have the incentive but a low ability
to increase leverage (Group 2) did not signiﬁcantly
Table 3
Regressions of change of leverage (DLEV) on LGTR and other control variables
Year Intercept LGTR GROWTH AROA LEV0 SIZE DDEP Obs Adj-R2
Panel A: Testing period
2001 Coeﬀ 0.014 0.015 0.081 0.236 0.143 0.004 0.106 464 0.147
T-stat (0.12) (1.66)* (5.94)** (4.63)** (5.39)** (0.77) (1.82)*
2002 Coeﬀ 0.205 0.008 0.155 0.253 0.136 0.013 0.022 464 0.261
T-stat (2.32)** (1.10) (9.85)** (6.40)** (6.78)** (3.00)** (0.42)
2003 Coeﬀ 0.017 0.013 0.145 0.618 0.127 0.004 0.172 464 0.368
T-stat (0.21) (1.84)* (12.26)** (11.99)** (6.50)** (1.00) (2.79)**
Cumulative Coeﬀ 0.148 0.033 0.088 1.359 0.373 0.017 0.093 464 0.423
T-stat (1.10) (3.03)** (11.22)** (12.92)** (11.63)** (2.59)** (1.16)
Panel B: Control period
1999 Coeﬀ 0.200 0.002 0.114 0.595 0.156 0.014 0.027 372 0.219
T-stat (2.01)** (0.24) (7.15)** (8.29)** (5.61)** (2.83)** (0.34)
2000 Coeﬀ 0.036 0.004 0.063 0.634 0.236 0.008 0.556 418 0.313
T-stat (0.33) (0.49) (5.90)** (7.06)** (8.48)** (1.51) (7.27)**
The dependent variable is DLEV, deﬁned as leverage(t)  leverage(t1), where leverage is total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. LGTR is
a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received LGTR in 2001, and 0 otherwise. GROWTH is the growth of assets, deﬁned as total assets(t)/total
assets(t1) 1. AROA is the average of return on assets (before tax) in year t and t  1. LEV0 is the leverage of year t  1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets. DDEP is the change of depreciation from year t  1 to t, divided by total assets. For variables in the cumulative regression, t is replaced with
2003, and t  1 is replaced with 2000. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represents signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4
Change of leverage conditional on LGTR and the accessibility of bank loans
Year Group Obs Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon test
Panel A: Testing period
2001 N-LGTR 272 1.12 1.26
LGTR-LA 102 2.73 1.88 1.30 0.10
LGTR-HA 90 3.44 2.79 2.27** 1.63
2002 N-LGTR 272 1.32 1.07
LGTR-LA 102 2.02 1.36 0.69 0.27
LGTR-HA 90 0.90 0.76 0.41 0.44
2003 N-LGTR 272 0.50 0.72
LGTR-LA 102 0.07 0.29 0.38 0.87
LGTR-HA 90 6.24 3.68 5.01** 4.47**
Cumulative N-LGTR 272 2.94 2.64
LGTR-LA 102 4.82 4.33 1.07 0.92
LGTR-HA 90 10.58 9.58 4.42** 4.44**
Panel B: Control period
1999 N-LGTR 224 1.36 0.46
LGTR-LA 79 0.90 1.42 0.36 0.40
LGTR-HA 69 0.18 0.36 1.10 1.04
2000 N-LGTR 251 0.95 0.76
LGTR-LA 90 0.50 0.17 0.38 0.36
LGTR-HA 77 1.59 0.82 0.48 0.13
The change of leverage in each year (DLEV) is deﬁned as leverage(t)  leverage(t1), where leverage is total liabilities divided by book value of total assets.
The cumulative change of leverage during 2001 to 2003 (DLEV) is deﬁned as leverage(2003)  leverage(2000). DLEV is presented in percentage. The sample
is divided into three groups. The base group is N-LGTR, which includes ﬁrms that did not receive LGTR in 2001. LGTR-LA group includes ﬁrms that
received LGTR in 2001 and have a low level of access to bank loans. LGTR-HA group includes ﬁrms that received LGTR in 2001 and have a high level of
access to bank loans. The table presents mean and median of leverage change for each group. We use T-test (Wilcoxon score test) to test whether the mean
(median) of DLEV in LGTR-LA (LGTR-HA) group is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with that of the base group (N-LGTR). ** and * represents signiﬁcance at
the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
36 L. Wu, H. Yue / Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 30–38
increase their leverage, which is consistent with Hypo-
thesis 2.17
Table 5 presents regression tests of Hypothesis 2.
Comparable to the regressions in Table 3, the LGTR var-
iable is divided into two dummy variables. LGTR-LA
equals 1 if the ﬁrm received LGTR and has a percentage
of non-tradable shares lower than the median, and 0
otherwise. It indicates ﬁrms that have the incentive but
a low ability to increase leverage. LGTR-HA equals 1
if the ﬁrm received LGTR and has a percentage of
non-tradable shares higher than the median, and 0 other-
wise. It indicates ﬁrms that have both the incentive and a
high ability to increase leverage. In the test period, we
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of LGTR-HA is signiﬁcant in
2001, 2003, and in the three-year cumulative, whereas
the coeﬃcient of LGTR-LA is not signiﬁcant in any year
from 2001 to 2003, or in the three-year cumulative. In the
control period, neither the coeﬃcient of LGTR-LA nor
the coeﬃcient of LGTR-HA is signiﬁcant in either year.
The regression results are consistent with the descriptive
results in Table 4. We also use the t-test to examine
the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients of LGTR-HA
and LGTR-LA and ﬁnd that they are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent.
In summary, our results support Hypothesis 2. The
leverage increases of LGTR ﬁrms were driven by LGTR
ﬁrms with a high level of access to bank loans. The incen-
tive to increase is important; however, the ability to ﬁnance
debt also matters.
4.4. Robustness check
We carry out several robustness checks. First, we use
long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets
as our measurement of leverage. As we have argued, ﬁrms
in China rely less on long-term debt, therefore, we use total
liabilities divided by total assets as our measure of leverage.
However, long-term debt may be more likely to represent
managers’ strategic choices regarding leverage, whereas
short-term debt may be due to operational needs. The
requirement of long-term debt information reduces the
sample to 423. Similar to previous analysis, we regress
cumulative leverage changes on LGTR and other control
variables. We ﬁnd that LGTR has a coeﬃcient of 0.02
(t = 2.80), which indicates that LGTR ﬁrms increased their
long-term debt in response to the termination of the LGTR
policy. We also divided the LGTR ﬁrms into two groups,
and rerun regressions as in Table 5. LGTR-HA has a coef-
ﬁcient of 0.03 (t = 3.30) and LGTR-LA has a coeﬃcient of
0.011 (t = 1.22). Therefore, use of long term-debt to mea-
sure leverage does not change our conclusion.
Another robustness check is to exclude ﬁrms that have
changed their registered locations. As we have noted, after
LGTR was terminated, there were still some areas in China
that enjoyed a preferential tax policy. Therefore, a ﬁrm
could change its registered address to an address in one
of those areas to continue enjoying the lower tax rate.18
To avoid this possibility, we examine the registered
addresses and include in our sample only those ﬁrms that
had the same registered address throughout the sample per-
iod. Our reﬁned sample includes 390 observations. We
Table 5
Regressions of change of leverage (DLEV) on LGTR-LA, LGTR-HA and other control variables
Year Intercept LGTR-LA LGTR-HA GROWTH AROA LEV0 SIZE DDEP Obs Adj-R2
Panel A: Testing period
2001 Coeﬀ 0.011 0.009 0.022 0.082 0.237 0.143 0.004 0.108 464 0.097
T-stat (0.10) (0.83) (1.85)* (5.99)** (4.65)** (5.36)** (0.74) (1.85)*
2002 Coeﬀ 0.205 0.013 0.002 0.155 0.252 0.136 0.013 0.022 464 0.261
T-stat (2.32)** (1.47) (0.25) (9.85)** (6.36)** (6.79)** (3.01)** (0.42)
2003 Coeﬀ 0.005 0.01 0.038 0.14 0.614 0.123 0.003 0.18 464 0.368
T-stat (0.07) (1.17) (4.40)** (12.01)** (12.18)** (6.47)** (0.87) (2.98)**
Cumulative Coeﬀ 0.129 0.013 0.056 0.088 1.347 0.370 0.016 0.096 464 0.423
T-stat (0.97) (0.96) (4.01)** (11.25)** (12.87)** (11.59)** (2.45)** (1.21)
Panel B: Control period
1999 Coeﬀ 0.201 0.003 0.001 0.114 0.594 0.157 0.014 0.027 372 0.219
T-stat (2.01)** (0.32) (0.05) (7.11)** (8.25)** (5.60)** (2.83)** (0.35)
2000 Coeﬀ 0.031 0.01 0.002 0.064 0.635 0.234 0.008 0.558 418 0.313
T-stat (0.29) (0.89) (0.16) (5.92)** (7.06)** (8.41)** (1.47) (7.29)**
The dependent variable is DLEV, deﬁned as leverage(t)-leverage(t1), where leverage is total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. LGTR-LA
(LGTR-HA) is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm received LGTR in 2001 and has a low (high) level of access to bank loans, and 0 otherwise.
GROWTH is the growth of assets, deﬁned as total assets(t)/total assets(t1) 1. AROA is the average of return of assets (before tax) in year t and t  1.
LEV0 is the leverage of year t  1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. DDEP is the change of depreciation from year t  1 to t, divided by total
assets. For variables in the cumulative regression, t is replaced with 2003, and t  1 is replaced with 2000. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and *
represents signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
17 Further tests indicate that the leverage changes are due to an increase
of liability. LGTR-HA ﬁrms increase their liability more than LGTR-LA
ﬁrms do.
18 Wu et al. (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms that changed their registered addresses
did have less eﬀective tax rates.
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rerun regressions in the reﬁned sample and get results that
are qualitatively the same.
Third, because our sample period was a time of rapid
change in Chinese ﬁnancial markets, there may be changes
in some variables that systematically aﬀect the leverage
decisions of LGTR ﬁrms and non-LGTR ﬁrms. We add
the GDP growth of the region in which the ﬁrms are regis-
tered as an independent variable and rerun the tests. The
GDP growth is not signiﬁcant, and our conclusions are
not changed.
We also use total liabilities minus payables (i.e.,
accounting, tax, and wage payables) as a numerator of
leverage, or winsorize all variables to 1% and 99% to elim-
inate the inﬂuence of outliers, and we get similar results.
Finally, we examine whether industries will aﬀect the
leverage changes. No matter how we classify industries
(protected vs. non-protected or manufacturing vs. non-
manufacturing), we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
5. Conclusion
Classical capital structure theory predicts that corporate
tax aﬀects ﬁrms’ choice of capital structure. Firms with
higher tax rates use more debt. Previous studies have
mainly examined the relationship between marginal tax
rates and leverage simultaneously. In this paper, we utilize
a particular circumstance in China to investigate how an
exogenous change of the tax rate aﬀects ﬁrms’ capital struc-
ture. In this circumstance, ﬁrms that had received LGTR
faced an increased corporate tax rate. We ﬁnd that these
LGTR ﬁrms increased their leverage compared with ﬁrms
that had no change of tax rate, which is consistent with
the theory.
We also ﬁnd that the increased leverage of LGTR ﬁrms
is related to their access to bank loans. We use the percent-
age of non-tradable shares as a proxy for the accessibility
of bank loans. Firms that have a higher percentage of
non-tradable shares have a higher level of access to bank
loans. We ﬁnd that LGTR ﬁrms with a high level of access
to bank loans increased their leverage more.
Our study sheds additional light on the relationship
between corporate tax rates and capital structure. It also
deepens our understanding of the determinants of capital
structure in a fast-growing emerging economy. Our study
suggests that the accessibility of ﬁnancing sources can be
a determinant of capital structure.
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